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Abstract
South–South transnational advocacy networks (SSTANs) targeting emerging states,
Southern companies, and their supporting institutions warrant nuanced distinctions
from traditional transnational advocacy networks that are heavily reliant on Northern
actors and targets, particularly in terms of the strategies and arguments they employ. This
article analyzes the dynamics of SSTANs through the case of an environmental campaign
against Brazilian hydropower projects proposed in the Peruvian Amazon. It demon-
strates how Southern actors are mobilizing against new and emerging patterns of
South–South cooperation, which, despite occurring on unfamiliar institutional terrain,
reproduces familiar asymmetrical power relations and socioenvironmental burdens.
In January 2010, Ruth Buendía Mestoquiari, director of the Asháninka Organi-
zation of the Ene River (CARE) from the Peruvian Amazon, visited Washington,
DC, to present a report to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
regarding the socioenvironmental impacts of hydroelectric dams on indigenous
communities in the Amazon basin. Summarizing her people’s position, she
stated, “For us the river does not generate money, the river gives us food, [it] gives
us life. The dam builders and oil, mining, and lumber companies want our re-
sources, but we want development in concert with our culture. Dams are not a
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part of our development” (International Rivers Network 2011, 3). Buendía deliv-
ered her speech at a time when Peru’s Amazonian communities were increasingly
facing encroachments by extractive projects, which were being granted concession
rights on traditional territories by the Peruvian state without prior consultation.
Earlier that year, the Brazilian and Peruvian governments had signed a
treaty authorizing the construction of a dam network stretching from the foot-
hills of the Peruvian Andes to the Amazon basin. This complex would consist of
ﬁve projects—the Inambari, Pakitzapango, Tambo 40, Tambo 60, and Mainique
dams—and produce upwards of 6,500 megawatts of electricity, most of which
would be exported to Brazil via the Madre de Dios–Acre border. However, sev-
eral Asháninka communities who lived within the Pakitzapango and Tambo 40
concession areas would be displaced from their lands to construct the dams,
while those downstream feared their livelihoods would be impacted by the pro-
jects.1 In response, Buendía mobilized community members, feeding into a
larger transnational campaign opposed to Brazilian hydroelectric development
in Peru. Reacting to the campaign’s pressure, Peru’s Ministry of Energy and
Mines (MINEM) canceled the Pakitzapango concession in December 2010.
The following year, the main shareholder in Tambo 40, Brazilian construction
giant Odebrecht, withdrew before construction could commence. And on May
23, 2014, the Foreign Relations Committee of Peru’s Congress struck down a
draft resolution required to pass the bilateral energy treaty into law, imperiling
the three remaining projects. For her efforts, Buendía received the International
Goldman Environmental Prize.2
While the blunt end of this socioenvironmental campaign transpired in
Peru, this is nevertheless a case of a South–South transnational advocacy net-
work (SSTAN): the Amazonian Hydroelectric Collective (CAH). It demonstrates
the agency of historically marginalized communities in transnational environ-
mental governance, who are mobilizing against the backdrop of growing global
demand for raw commodities and renewable energy and within a geopolitical
milieu in which emerging economies are rewriting the territorial and environ-
mental politics of the Amazon. We analyze the structure and strategies of this
SSTAN, whose anti-dam campaign targeted two resource-dependent states,
transnational enterprises, and a national development bank.
By proceeding inductively, we aim to supplement existing frameworks and
add more precision to encompass new cases of transnational environmental ad-
vocacy in the global South considering the rise of the BRICS. In recent decades,
these economies have intensiﬁed their investment activities abroad, particularly
1. The Asháninka’s lands straddle the Peru-Brazil border. In Brazil, most live within the western-
most state of Acre; in Peru, the population is spread across the regions of Junín, Pasco, Huánuco,
and Ucuyali, with many living along the basins of the rivers Urubamba, Ene, Tambo, Alto Perene,
Pachitea, Pichis, and Alto Ucayali.
2. The Goldman Environmental Prize is awarded annually to grassroots environmental activists for
their work in protecting the natural environmental and vulnerable populations from destructive
activities, often at great risk to their personal safety.
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in the primary sectors of their Southern neighbors. But this is creating new chal-
lenges for socioenvironmental campaigns, as the BRICS circumvent multilateral
institutions and organizations by utilizing their own national development
banks and private enterprises to ﬁnance and construct controversial mega-
projects. These agents of South–South development cannot easily be leveraged
by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organi-
zations, or developed country governments. Still, this has not prevented some
campaigns from pushing against strategic national interests, as transnational en-
vironmental advocacy adapts to the accompanying opportunity structures.
Accordingly, we argue CAH’s anti-Brazilian hydroelectric campaign in Peru
can provide fruitful insights into the ways environmental advocacy in the South
is responding to the rising inﬂuence of the BRICS. While this campaign was
aided by some favorable exogenous factors, the network was instrumental in
pressuring targets transnationally and “from below” to abandon projects on
Peruvian territory. Rather than strategizing around a boomerang pattern, CAH
hedged its bets by executing a triple-target strategy, simultaneously pointing its
sights at the Peruvian and Brazilian governments, Brazilian transnational
enterprises, and Brazil’s national development bank.
South–South Transnational Advocacy: Shifting Opportunity Structures
A well-established literature on transnational advocacy networks (TANs) has
demonstrated the dynamic and multifaceted nature of international activism.3
TANs maneuver within political opportunity structures,4 employ multiple framing
strategies (Snow 2007; Tarrow 2005), and help activists to shift scales (Haarstad
and Fløysand 2007; Tarrow and McAdam 2005). Several campaigns have inﬂu-
enced the policies of national governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998), inter-
national ﬁnancial institutions (Park 2005), and the private sector (Macleod
and Park 2011; McAteer and Pulver 2009) through the “boomerang” pattern.5
3. TANs are organizational forms that “plead the causes of others or defend a cause or proposition”
through principled campaigns. They are characterized by “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal
patterns of communication and exchange,” with “ﬂuid and open relations occurring among com-
mitted and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 8).
4. Political opportunity structures are factors both exogenous and endogenous to social move-
ments that either enhance or inhibit the prospects for mobilization. They may consist of exter-
nal factors, such as international and domestic institutions, constellations of power, and
historical precedents, and internal ones, including material resources and social capital. While
opportunity structures may not have deterministic effects on the success or failure of a cam-
paign, they nevertheless shape the strategies and tactics adopted by actors (Tarrow 2011; Tilly
and Tarrow 2015).
5. Unable to directly inﬂuence the policies of national governments “from below,” domestic civil
society actors may enlist the help of international NGOs to pressure targets indirectly from “out-
side” and “above,” typically via multilateral fora (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12–13, 24). A “share-
holder boomerang” has also been observed in campaigns targeting the local subsidiaries of
transnational corporations. Local groups may build alliances with international NGOs, who
use their access to pressure institutional investors and executives in the foreign headquarters
of the parent company (McAteer and Pulver 2009).
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This pattern has been observed, notably, in human rights campaigns but also in
indigenous rights and environmental campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 12).
However, many geopolitical and technological changes have occurred
since the seminal TAN conceptual framework was developed, requiring nuanced
supplementation when applying it to contemporary cases. For one, cross-border
investment ﬂows in the primary sectors are no longer predominantly North–
South, nor do they occur within the environmental controls of multilateral
institutions and organizations. Since the mid-2000s, these ﬂows have become
increasingly South–South and structured around the institutional infrastructure
and agents of the BRICS. At the same time, many civil society actors in the
global South no longer confront the same dearth of material resources that once
compelled them to enlist Northern intermediaries. For instance, communica-
tions technologies (e.g., internet, cell phones, social media) have become more
accessible to even some of the most remote and marginalized of communities,
alleviating some of the historical dependencies on international NGOs for
information exchange and exposure. Combined, these developments suggest
that advocacy campaigns triggered by South–South development initiatives are
likely to confront novel opportunity structures compared to seminal North–
South cases (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
Importantly, contemporary case instances also entail apt conditions for
analyzing Southern agency within the transnational advocacy space—a subject
that has not been especially visible within the study of global environmental
politics.6 Accordingly, we describe the South–South transnational advocacy net-
work (SSTAN). SSTANs are subcategories of TANs whose information, symbolic,
leverage, and accountability politics derive primarily from the cross-border ac-
tivities and interactions of Southern actors, including grassroots social move-
ments, research and advocacy organizations, and local and national NGOs.
Our focus on Southern actors is not to suggest that international NGOs do
not operate within advocacy campaigns responding to South–South investment
ﬂows and development initiatives. Northern allies are indeed likely to remain
present, providing some ﬁnance to support day-to-day activities, and to help
facilitate international media exposure. But they do not lead or act as the drivers
or gatekeepers of campaigns – doing so can be incredibly risky for local activists
as states hosting extractive investments have increasingly accused them of oper-
ating as “agents of foreign inﬂuence” to delegitimize their grievances, and to
justify harsh repression and the severing of funding ties (Matejova et al.
2018). Rather, the locus of agency in areas such as strategy selection, informa-
tion exchange, and day-to-day campaigning revolves around these networks’
Southern nodes, with mobilizations from “below” providing the crux of cam-
paign pressure.
SSTANs emerge from the opportunity structures encircling exclusively
South–South modes of market and/or state-based interactions, which do not
6. Notable exceptions include Martin (2011) and Kauffman and Martin (2014).
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easily facilitate boomerang patterns of advocacy. Such patterns critically depend
upon international NGOs and/or developed country governments to plead on
behalf of aggrieved groups from outside and above. However, the bilateral char-
acter of regional South–South infrastructure projects precludes networks from ac-
tivating traditional global institutions and organizations to bring pressure to bear
on their targets. Importantly, the BRICS’ use of national ﬁnancial institutions and
corporations domiciled within these states has prohibited activists from leverag-
ing global socioenvironmental standards against the agents of South–South de-
velopment projects. For instance, multilateral development banks (e.g., World
Bank) can act as crucial levers for socioenvironmental campaigners in the South
(Keck and Sikkink 1998; Park 2005), as their internal organizational structure en-
ables activists to inﬂuence their lending mandates (Sierra and Hochstetler 2017),
which can be used to ensure that actors adhere to dominant global standards,
such as prior consultation. This capacity to leverage targets indirectly from outside
and above rests fundamentally on the structural power multilateral lenders exert
over the recipients of development ﬁnance. Moreover, as visible international fora
ostensibly committed to sustainable development, these banks can more easily
be “named and shamed” if the projects they ﬁnance violate global standards.
However, a notable feature of South–South development cooperation in-
volving the BRICS has been their use of “globalized” national development
banks to supply ﬁnance for megaprojects abroad. These banks uphold markedly
lower socioenvironmental standards than their multilateral counterparts (Sierra
and Hochstetler 2017). Their primary loan conditionality is that recipients
source the goods and services for proposed projects from lending country oper-
ators. Unlike multilateral lenders, socioenvironmental safeguards are not a key
component of the loans. Instead, projects ﬁnanced by these banks are governed
by the social and environmental regulations of host countries, which may vary
in their robustness and degree of enforcement.
In sum, the institutional and organizational physiology of exclusively
South–South modes of development suggests a short-circuiting of the boomer-
ang pattern of transnational advocacy. One implication of this is a reduction in
the centrality of international NGOs to those campaigns targeting the BRICS.
Thus the conceptual distinction between TAN and SSTAN is a relevant one to
make when analyzing instances of environmental advocacy triggered by South–
South development initiatives. Contextualized case study analysis can help
uncover the conditions under which they are likely to succeed.
Method
To parse the factors responsible for SSTAN efﬁcacy, we employ a deviant case
selection strategy (Gerring 2007). All things equal, we would expect CAH’s
anti-dam campaign to have been unsuccessful in halting the two hydroelectric pro-
jects planned on Asháninka lands, much less forcing Peru’s congress to strike
down the bilateral energy treaty with Brazil. First, environmental opposition
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to megaprojects in Peru confronts existential and institutional barriers to suc-
cess. For one, the state has maintained a long-standing extractivist economic devel-
opment model, which has seen national authorities regularly criminalize protest
and employ racist rhetoric to discredit locals, especially indigenous groups (Perez
2007). What is more, the relationships of power structuring the environmental
governance of megaprojects have privileged investors’ interests. Notably, MINEM,
the very agency responsible for promoting Peru’s resource endowments to the
world, exercises ﬁnal authority over the review of environmental impact assess-
ments for hydroelectric projects, not the Ministry of Environment, as a horizontal
system of environmental regulation would necessitate. Moreover, the General
Directorate of Environmental Affairs—the ofﬁce within MINEM responsible for re-
viewing impact assessments—has been chronically underresourced, leading many
environmental impact assessments to be approved without adequate review.7
Second, during the mandate of former president “Lula” da Silva (2003–
2010), and the ﬁrst two years of the presidency of his successor, Dilma Rousseff
(2011–2012), Brazil would have been an unlikely target of grassroots opposi-
tion to South–South development initiatives in Latin America. Under their lead-
ership, socioeconomic development was a cornerstone of Brazil’s international
policy agenda; through South–South cooperation, projects were guided by an
ethos of “solidarity” and a policy of regional integration. Their rhetoric was
for poverty and inequality reduction and for growth with inclusion (Dauvergne
and Farias 2012; Inoue and Costa Vaz 2012). Compared to Northern or Chinese
investors, Brazil could present itself as a relatively benign alternative. Moreover,
as Latin American neighbors, these two countries could draw upon shared in-
terests, identities, and histories. Accordingly, Brazilian entities operating in Peru
would be least likely to confront the political “liability of foreignness,” as they
would be viewed with higher levels of trust (Zaheer 1995).
When considered with the challenges of collective action,8 these factors
should have undermined CAH’s campaign. However, it not only terminated
the Pakitzapango and Tambo 40 dams but forced the congress to reject the
bilateral energy treaty.
Data for this case were collected by the ﬁrst and second authors through
ﬁeldwork trips to Peru and Brazil between 2012 and 2016. They consisted of
semistructured Spanish- and Portuguese-language interviews with key infor-
mants and decision makers; content analysis; and participant observation.
Background
Since 2009, Brazil has increasingly turned to its neighbors to enhance energy
security. The competing pressures of rising national demand and domestic
7. Second author’s interview with former deputy minister of the environment, Lima, Peru, May
2014.
8. Mobilizations against megaprojects in Peru often remain isolated and fragmented, rarely
inﬂuencing national policies (Paredes 2016).
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opposition to hydroelectric projects have forced authorities to shift their gaze
abroad. Accordingly, Brazil began to negotiate with Peru in 2006 to cooperate
on energy production. These negotiations culminated on June 16, 2010, with
the signing of an accord by the then governments of Lula (Brazil) and Alan
Garcia (Peru). The treaty articulated ofﬁcial support for bilateral energy cooperation
and laid the basic investment groundwork for the infrastructure needed to meet the
production goal of seventy-two hundred megawatts (Ministerio de Energía y Minas
2010). Financial capital for the required infrastructure would be provided by
Brazil’s Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES),9 which would provide
loans to Brazil’s “national champion” enterprises, such as the construction ﬁrms
Odebrecht, Construtora OAS, and Andrade Gutierrez; the electrical utility providers
Eletrobrás and Furnas; and the engineering ﬁrm Engevix (Banco Nacional de
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 2004; Castro et al. 2011). Several of these
ﬁrms would operate as a consortium when conducting feasibility studies.
Both Peruvian and Brazilian civil societies had scant opportunities to in-
ﬂuence the treaty negotiations, despite Brazilian companies having direct access
to decision makers.10 Authorities also disclosed minimal information to the
public, with most of the information that was available lauding the treaty’s ben-
eﬁts (Bermann et al. 2016; Dourojeanni et al. 2009; Rodrigues et al. 2011).
However, few details were disclosed about how many projects would be re-
quired to meet the treaty’s energy production goal, much less their proposed
locations. These details would only emerge because of the CAH campaign
(see Figure 1).
The proposed projects were also a matter of strategic value to Brazil, which
planned to dam the Inambari, Urubamba, Junín, Ene, and Tambo rivers, which
feed into Brazil’s Madeira River in the heart of the Amazon basin. Brazil has
long sought to exert greater control over Madeira’s upstream ﬂows, as the river
supplies energy to the Santo Antonio and Jirau hydropower plants in the state of
Rondônia. However, they entailed signiﬁcant risks for many vulnerable commu-
nities on the Peruvian side of the border, with concession rights being granted
by MINEM without the state consulting locals ﬁrst (Mundo 2010). Accordingly,
for many on the Peruvian side, mobilizing against the treaty and its proposed
projects was an existential necessity.
Characteristics of the Network
Nodes
The origins of CAH can be traced to an alliance between two grassroots
groups—CARE and the rondas campesinas—and several NGOs based in the
9. Between 2004 and 2015, BNDES loans doubled as it stepped in to fund many socially and
environmentally risky projects rejected by the World Bank. Sierra and Hochstetler (2017) argue
that BNDES has driven a “race to the bottom.”
10. First author’s interviews with MINEM and NGO representatives, Peru and Brazil, 2012–2014.
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Peruvian capital, Lima. CARE is a federation of seventeen Asháninka commu-
nities living in thirty-three settlements from the region of Junín. Formed in
the early 1990s to protect against Shining Path guerrillas during Peru’s civil
conﬂict, the organization has since transformed to advocate for indigenous
self-determination (International Rivers Network 2011, 3). Like CARE, the
rondas campesinas were also formed during Peru’s internal conﬂict as auto-
nomous self-defense groups. However, they enjoy formal legal protections
under the state and have been granted authority to implement customary
law. While historically most active in the Andean highlands, they have also
been a potent mobilizing force among peasant farmers, cocaleros, and artisanal
Figure 1
Location of Dams Proposed by Treaty.
Source: First author’s adapted map from CAH documents.
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miners in the jungle region of Madre de Dios—the proposed transit point for
energy exportation to Brazil.
Both grassroots actors had preexisting relationships with three Lima-based
NGOs that had long maintained ties to local assemblies in Peru’s highland and
Amazon regions: Rural Education Services (SER), the Peru Solidarity Forum, and
the Peruvian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature (ProNaturaleza). These
NGOs acted as conduits linking local actors from Junín and Madre de Dios to
two national environmental organizations advocating for Amazonian sustain-
ability at the national and international levels: Rights, Environment and Natural
Resources (DAR) and the Peruvian Society for Environmental Rights (SPDA). As
the network formed, DAR and SPDA would coordinate CAH’s in-country activ-
ities but, importantly, would help this nascent conglomeration of anti-dam in-
terests to expand transnationally.11 Through their contacts, DAR and SPDA
integrated Brazilian organizations with expertise in that country’s hydroelectric
sector. Capitalizing on Ruth Buendía Mestoquiari’s rising global proﬁle as an
anti-dam activist, these Lima-based NGOs enlisted the support of the Brasilia-
based arm of the International Rivers Network (IRN), an organization that had
long advocated on behalf of dam-affected peoples and, as a result, had a wealth
of knowledge on the country’s hydroelectric development strategy. With IRN
acting as a Brazilian gatekeeper, CAH could enlist the support and resources
of other prominent environmental NGOs, including the Socio-Environmental
Institute (ISA), the Life Centre Institute (ICV), and Greenpeace Brazil.
Brazilian NGOs assisted grassroots efforts in Peru, not only expressing
ideological support for the struggle but, importantly, supplying their allies
across the border with ﬁnances and intelligence for the campaign. For example,
through Brazilian NGOs, grassroots actors involved in opposition to the con-
troversial Belo Monte and São Luis do Tapajós projects in the Brazilian state
of Pará expressed solidarity with CAH. Moreover, the Movement of People
Affected by Dams provided information on useful pressure tactics through Via
Campesina, which had linkages to the rondas in Madre de Dios.12 The CASA
Socio-Environmental Fund helped cover the costs required to hire legal experts
for CARE in Peru, such as the Amazon Centre of Anthropology and Practical
Application (CAAP) and the Ecumenical Foundation for Development and
Peace (FEDEPAZ).13 Importantly, Brazilian NGOs operated as the network’s
intelligence arm. At the time of the treaty negotiations (2006–2009), Brazilian
environmental NGOs were already challenging their government’s national
energy plan as well as its plans to expand hydroelectric investment both at home
and abroad. Through meetings with members of the Foreign Ministry, the
11. Within CAH, decision-making authority rotated regularly between DAR and SPDA.
12. First author’s interviews with representatives of ISA and the Socio-Economic Studies Institute,
Manaus, Brazil, February 2013.
13. Financial support for the campaign was also provided by Northern foundations, such as the
Rainforest Foundation UK and the Mott, Moore, and Bluemoon foundations, which channeled
funds through SPDA, DAR, SER, and ProNaturaleza.
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Ministry of Mining and Energy, and the Human Rights Commission of Con-
gress, as well as several of the companies that would be contracted to construct
the projects, they gained access to technical information about the treaty and
the locations of its proposed projects that, at the time the treaty was signed,
was unavailable to grassroots actors in Peru. Through their Lima-based con-
tacts, Brazilian NGOs transmitted information about the dams as well as
Brazil’s plans to ramp up energy importation from its neighbors. These
cross-border exchanges were instrumental to CAH, as they provided a knowl-
edge base from which to structure its campaign activities in Peru.14
To complement these efforts, CAH also drew on academics from Peru,
Brazil, and the United States, several of whom played dual roles as knowledge
producers and activists, consulting for IRN and DAR. Scholar-activists from the
ﬁelds of ecology, economics, and international relations helped to advance the
network’s scientiﬁc and principled claims. For example, ecologists published re-
ports on the socioecological risks posed by the dam network, demonstrating
that sudden breaks in the connectivity of the Amazon river systems would trig-
ger severe impacts on species, biodiversity, and deforestation and would
adversely impact the livelihoods of riverine communities (Finer and Jenkins
2012; Finer and Orta-Martínez 2010). Ecological economists demonstrated that
the long-term payments for ecosystem services outweighed the economic re-
turns (Rodrigues et al. 2011; Vega 2011), while others argued that the treaty
itself violated indigenous communities’ human right to prior consultation
(Moreira 2016; Rosa 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the CAH network, the linkages
between actors, and their sites of action.
Demands
The CAH campaign revolved around two primary goals: cessation of projects
that did not meet reasonable standards of prior consultation and rejection of
the energy treaty. To achieve these, members articulated a variety of more spec-
iﬁed demands. Prominent among them were calls for Peru to develop a long-
term national energy plan, which it did not have at the time the treaty was being
negotiated. The absence of such a plan, CAH argued, would force Peru to cede
control over energy production to Brazil, as its more powerful neighbor was
better prepared to dictate the treaty’s terms and implement the agreement. Sec-
ond, and related, was the need for energy sector planning in Peru to facilitate
broad civil society input (Rosa 2011). Third, given that several of the proposed
investments impacted indigenous lands, both states had to demonstrate respect
for indigenous self-determination by complying with existing human rights
frameworks. Here CAH sought to draw attention to the gap between both states’
legal obligations under ILO Convention 169 and their development practice.15
14. First author’s interviews with NGO ofﬁcials, Brasilia, Brazil, July 2012.
15. Peru ratiﬁed ILO 169 in 1994, Brazil in 2002.
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Finally, to protect free-ﬂowing rivers, CAH demanded that both the Peruvian
and Brazilian governments develop an integrated plan for the sustainable man-
agement of the Andean–Amazon corridor.16
Targets and Tactics
CAH structured its pressure campaign around the Peruvian government, the
Brazilian transnational enterprises contracted to construct the dams, and
BNDES. As the custodian of the country’s resource base on behalf of citizens,
Peru’s national government was the network’s most important target. National
authorities had the capacity to approve or reject not only the treaty but also the
individual projects through the state’s concession and environmental licensing
processes. CAH sought to affect state policy using direct and indirect methods.
First, it acted to shift public perception of South–South energy “cooperation” by
focusing attention on the self-interests Brazil had in the treaty. To do so, CAH
Figure 2
CAH Network Linkages and Targets.
16. These demands were collated from interviews; copies of letters sent to congress in Brazil and
Peru, ﬂyers and reports, and public debates that occurred between 2012 and 2015.
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presented a polemical alternative to the Brazilian narrative, claiming that this
case embodied a new and pernicious instance of a regional power “exploiting”
its neighbor’s resources (see later). Second, as gatekeepers of treaty ratiﬁcation,
CAH engaged Peru’s legislative branch. Speciﬁcally, SPDA and DAR met rou-
tinely with members of congressional committees, such as the Indigenous
Peoples Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, and organized a
letter-writing campaign directed at elected ofﬁcials.17 CAH also attempted to levy
indirect pressure on MINEM through legislators. For instance, one of the most
prominent voices within CAH was the director of SPDA, Mariano Castro, who
frequently met with environment ministry ofﬁcials to discuss the adverse im-
pacts of the treaty.18 In 2012, Castro was appointed vice-minister of environ-
ment, and in October 2013, under his direction, he began to send letters to
legislative committees outlining the environmental and social costs that the
treaty would generate (Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores 2014). Through these
discursive activities, CAH emphasized the need not only to reject the treaty but
also for the broader issue of long-term energy planning to be discussed trans-
parently at the national level.
Lastly, under the auspices of CARE and represented by Ruth Buendía
Mestoquiari, Asháninka communities challenged the legality of hydroelectric devel-
opment on customary lands. After letters sent to MINEM failed to stop ministry
ofﬁcials from approving the temporary concessions, CARE, with the ﬁnancial
and legal support of CAAP and FEDEPAZ, ﬁled complaints with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the ILO, arguing that the Pakitzapango and
Tambo 40 projects violated their human rights (Central Asháninka del Rio Ene
and Centro Amazonico de Antropologia y Aplicacion Practica 2010–2011).
Though Brazilian NGOs could not mount a legal challenge against Brazil, they
argued that it too would be complicit in rights violations (International Rivers
Network 2011).
CAH also targeted Brazil’s “national champion” enterprises via their Peruvian
subsidiaries. Of the dams proposed by the bilateral energy treaty, Pakitzapango
and Tambo 40 were the ﬁrst to secure temporary concessions from MINEM,
allowing them to proceed with initial feasibility studies in the hope of securing
formal concessions and transitioning to the environmental licensing stage.
Eager to commence with the projects, Energía SAC Pakitzapango and Odebrecht
Perú Ingenería y Construcción SAC began the contentious process of attempting
to construct social licenses. However, several community stakeholders refused to
attend corporate-led information and dialogue sessions put on by the Peruvian
subsidiaries. Such acts were designed to compromise the legitimacy and social
viability of the investments. In addition, Asháninka groups in Junín (organized
by CARE) and peasant farmers, cocaleros, and artisanal miners in Madre de Dios
17. Documents on ﬁle with ﬁrst author; author’s interview with congressional ofﬁcials, Lima, Peru,
August 2014.
18. First author’s interviews with Environment Ministry ofﬁcials, Lima, Peru, August 2014.
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(organized by the rondas campesinas) utilized acts of direct and open conten-
tion against the conglomeration of Brazilian enterprises, including efforts to oc-
cupy the concession areas and street protests in nearby towns. These activities
coincided with similar acts against the Peruvian subsidiary Egasur SAC in the
regions of Puno, Cusco, and Madre de Dios, in which rural communities staged
a thirty-six-day strike and mass protests to revoke Inambari’s concession, and
against Andrade Gutierrez in the region of Cusco to revoke Mainique’s conces-
sion (Perú21 2011). While these acts of open contention communicated to
MINEM demands to revoke concession rights, they were also designed to signal
to the conglomeration of parent enterprises in Brazil the sociopolitical risks that
would accompany their investment decisions in Peru. High-visibility mobiliza-
tions demonstrated that some grassroots actors were willing to paralyze con-
struction by direct action, if necessary.
Finally, as ﬁnancier of the proposed projects, BNDES—and, by extension,
the Brazilian state—acted as CAH’s third target. CAH mounted a two-pronged
attack on the bank, attempting to leverage ofﬁcials at its Rio de Janeiro head-
quarters and its Lima satellite ofﬁce. Like the other targets, CAH utilized a com-
bination of direct and indirect tactics, making use of both discursive efforts and
visible protest measures. For example, the Brasilia-based arm of IRN, in conjunc-
tion with scholar-activists, sent technical reports directly to bank ofﬁcials in Rio
outlining the socioenvironmental impacts of the individual projects (Verdum
2013). Even after MINEM declared Pakitzapango invalid in 2010 and Odebrecht
withdrew support for Tambo 40 in 2011, the status of the three other projects
remained uncertain. On the Peruvian side of the border, DAR and CARE sent
letters to the bank’s Lima satellite ofﬁce, while coordinating a national media
campaign to highlight its funding of destructive projects in Peru. At the time,
CAH was helping to lay the groundwork for a broader Latin American SSTAN
focused exclusively on BNDES lending practices, the Regional Coalition for
Transparency and Participation. This emerging conglomeration of civil society
actors from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru would raise concerns about
the bank’s lack of transparency to draw attention to its socioenvironmental
impacts.19 In 2012, during the Rio+20 world summit, the Coalition staged an
occupation of the bank’s Rio headquarters (Medina et al. 2014; Regional Coa-
lition for Transparency and Participation 2014; Verdum 2013).
Innovative Framing
To ensure the campaign resonated with civil society audiences on both sides of
the border, CAH invoked a novel symbolism, framing Brazilian South–South
energy development as a form of neocolonialism. By depicting Brazil as a
19. Since 2016, the Coalition has increasingly liaised with NGOs from China and India seeking to
induce similar reforms within globalized national development banks domiciled in those
countries.
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new “colonial exploiter”20 of natural resources, the Peruvian government was
also recast, not as a partner in energy development, but as a client of its more
powerful neighbor. For example, CAH’s campaign ﬂyers consistently high-
lighted the unequal relationship between the two countries, posing contro-
versial questions such as “Why is Peru ceding its hydro power potential and
mistreating its Amazon?”21 To do this, grassroots groups and Lima-based NGOs
drew on the discourses of sovereignty, human and indigenous rights, and envi-
ronmental protection when challenging the legality of the proposed invest-
ments. Furthermore, CAH likened Brazil’s energy importation strategy to the
brutal history of subsoil exploitation Peru had endured under Spanish rule. This
framing was particularly powerful and resonated well among rural communities
in the Andes and Amazon basin who, being at the blunt end of the country’s
resource-based development model, were already employing anticolonial rhe-
toric when mobilizing against Northern investors.22 This frame also helped con-
vince members of the congress that the treaty was not in the long-term national
interest, as it could lock the country into ﬁfty to eighty years of energy exporta-
tion, which could undermine economic growth and the country’s ability to meet
its own domestic energy needs.
What is more, because BNDES policy required Peru to source services from
its “national champion” enterprises, Brazilian companies (and their Peruvian
subsidiaries) could be cast as agents of the Brazilian state, who, in the pursuit
of its long-term energy security needs, were effectively “exporting” human
rights violations and social conﬂicts. This symbolism was further buttressed
by CAH’s rights-based arguments, which saw its Peruvian nodes draw attention
to the historic exclusion of peasant and indigenous communities from national
decision-making and present data on the contemporary socioeconomic hard-
ships these groups have faced in Peru as result of megaprojects. The energy
treaty and its associated projects, members argued, would exacerbate this situa-
tion of exclusion. This neocolonial master frame contradicted the conventional
wisdom that South–South relations and regional integration were rooted in
“solidarity,” which Brazil had been actively promoting as the best alternative
to exploitative modes of North–South investment since 2003.
Effectiveness
The efﬁcacy of CAH’s campaign can be assessed across different ﬁelds of activ-
ism. In particular, we observe notable achievements in the area of issue creation
but also in the area of policy and behavior change (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
20. This was a term key informants commonly uttered.
21. Document on ﬁle with ﬁrst author.
22. Second author’s interviews with local environmental activist, Cusco, Peru, June 2014; local en-
vironmental activist, Cajamarca, Peru, September 2014; and local mayor, Ancash, Peru,
November 2014.
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In terms of issue creation, CAH ﬁrst offered a new interpretation of South–
South energy development that inﬂuenced the state’s eventual decision to reject
the treaty. By framing the Brazilian state and its champion enterprises as the
“new colonizers,” CAH problematized the issue of South–South energy cooper-
ation, likening it to the plunder and exploitation the country had experienced
under colonial rule and, more recently, with Northern investors. Moreover, by
recasting this policy issue in terms of neocolonialism, CAH could more effec-
tively pressure Lima-based ofﬁcials to consider how the treaty and its proposed
projects affected the country’s ability to exercise sovereign control over its nat-
ural resource base. This coincided well with preexisting debates over resource
nationalism, which were becoming increasingly salient within the country’s ex-
tractive sectors. One high-ranking MINEM ofﬁcial alluded to the inﬂuence of
this when explaining the ministry’s eventual recommendation to reject the ac-
cord, noting that only if the relative gains had weighed better in Peru’s favor,
then the treaty may have been viable.23 In its decision to reject the treaty, the
Foreign Relations Committee also alluded to this issue, expressing consterna-
tion that the “real reason” behind Brazil’s push for the energy treaty was to meet
its own domestic demand, irrespective of what this entailed for Peruvians (Co-
misión de Relaciones Exteriores 2014).
Second, CAH was instrumental in pressuring Peruvian authorities to initi-
ate the process of long-term energy planning. At the time of the treaty negotia-
tions, Peru lacked a national energy strategy. This was deemed by CAH to have
placed the country at a negotiating disadvantage, which it argued enabled Brazil
to secure better terms. However, this policy vacuum also created discursive space
for CAH to emphasize the importance of long-term energy planning, which oc-
cupied a central position in its campaign after the treaty was signed in 2010.
Here CAH had notable inﬂuence over authorities in Lima, as MINEM formally
published the country’s ﬁrst long-term national energy plan in 2014 with its
“Plan Energético Nacional 2014–2025” (see Ministerio de Energía y Minas
2014).
Although policy and behavior change can only be robustly assessed in the
long term, our case does suggest some preliminary indicators of efﬁcacy. While
we cannot conclude with certainty that Peru will not revert to energy exportation
to Brazil over the long term, formal rejection of the bilateral treaty is never-
theless prima facie indication of a short-term policy shift that would not likely
have occurred without the CAH campaign. Notably, MINEM canceled the
temporary concession for Pakitzapango before initial feasibility studies were
conducted. Within the context of Peru, this act was signiﬁcant, as concession
rights are rarely revoked prior to environmental impact assessments. While this
does not indicate a transformational shift in MINEM policy regarding the grant-
ing of temporary concessions, it is noteworthy in that it reﬂected a rare act to
nullify a proﬁtable concession that did not meet prior consultation standards.
23. First author’s interview with vice-minister of energy and mines, Lima, Peru, August 2014.
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Some short-term policy and behavioral changes were also observed among
the consortium of Brazilian enterprises contracted to construct the proposed
projects. In particular, Odebrecht’s decision to withdraw from Tambo 40 was
made in Brazil at the board level and reﬂected a combination of desires to re-
duce risks and comply with human rights norms. For instance, in a letter sent to
the regional government of Junín, a representative of Odebrecht’s Peruvian sub-
sidiary referenced the need to “avoid social conﬂicts” as a major reason for the
company abandoning Tambo 40 and for not challenging MINEM’s Pakitzapango
decision. Letters sent by company ofﬁcials to MINEM also added that executives
had read CARE’s letters to the Peruvian government and agreed on the need to
“respect the opinions of local populations.”24 However, the main shareholders
in the remaining Inambari, Tambo 60, and Mainique projects, such as Eletro-
brás and OAS Ltda., have demonstrated a wait-and-see response, deciding not
openly to push forward but neither to divest ofﬁcially.25
Despite its achievements with the ﬁrst two targets, CAH had no impact
on BNDES policy or behavior. This ﬁnding supports previous ﬁndings on the
weak inﬂuence environmental activists have had on BNDES’ lending policy
(Sierra and Hochstetler 2017). However, as noted, the CAH campaign con-
tributed to the creation of a BNDES-focused SSTAN, the Regional Coalition
for Transparency and Participation, which has made some modest inroads to-
ward pressuring BNDES to adopt transparency standards (Sierra and Hochstetler
2017). What is more, this SSTAN has since begun to liaise with Indian and
Chinese advocacy networks seeking to make similar inroads with their coun-
tries’ globalized national development banks (Regional Coalition for Transpar-
ency and Participation 2014).
Proximate Exogenous Factors
It is worth noting that some seemingly unrelated factors contributed to the out-
comes of CAH’s campaign by increasing the vulnerabilities of the Peruvian state
to anti-dam mobilizations and by cementing its decision to suspend energy
cooperation with Brazil.
Socioenvironmental conﬂict has increased markedly in Peru since 2004
(Defensoría del Pueblo 2014). The rising levels of violence and insecurity asso-
ciated with it has, more recently, prompted national authorities to adopt a risk-
averse approach when responding, from which CAH beneﬁted. Several conﬂicts
have been emblematic of the state’s mismanagement (e.g., the “Baguazo” mas-
sacre of 2009), but one that was proximate to CAH’s campaign stands out as
particularly important. In 2012, peasant and urban groups mobilized against
the proposed Conga mine in the Andean region of Cajamarca. Despite cam-
paigning a year earlier on a platform to renegotiate the country’s relationship
24. Documents on ﬁle with ﬁrst author.
25. First author’s interview with former director of SPDA, Lima, Peru, August 2014.
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with mining, at the time, the recently elected president Ollanta Humala (2011–
2016) authorized security forces to intervene to push forward with Conga. This
led to a series of clashes that killed ﬁve and injured hundreds (La Republica
2012), triggering a political crisis for the Humala administration as several
high-proﬁle ofﬁcials resigned in protest.26 Importantly, as CAH was ramping
up its campaign in Peru, the executive branch was only recently beginning to
emerge from the Conga scandal. Wary from almost a decade of rising socio-
environmental conﬂict, moreover, authorities and legislators in Lima were facing
increasing pressure to proceed cautiously when responding protest movements
targeting large-scale infrastructure projects. While most socioenvironmental
conﬂict in Peru revolved around mining investments, hydroelectric dams were
becoming a new front along which antimining activists were mobilizing.27
Second, two months prior to the Peruvian Congress’ rejection of the bilat-
eral treaty, Brazil was thrust into a period of protracted national economic and
political turmoil. By March 2014, the now famous Operation Carwash was be-
ginning to expose a web of corruption involving major political ﬁgures and the
country’s champion enterprises, including, notably, Odebrecht. The scandal was
further compounded by a 2015 recession, which triggered the controversial im-
peachment of President Rousseff in 2016. These successive domestic crises not
only harmed Brazil’s reputation as a “third-way” development power but, im-
portantly, had the effect of shifting domestic priority away from regional energy
integration as its executive branch dealt with the political fallout. In the year that
followed rejection of the bilateral energy treaty, Brazil’s reputation was in such
tatters that diplomats could not overcome its credibility problem when attempt-
ing to lobby Peruvian ofﬁcials to renew energy treaty talks.
Finally, Peru has steadily shifted its gaze toward Asia, diminishing the rel-
ative importance of Brazil as a Southern partner. Since the mid-2000s, Peruvian
authorities have increasingly appealed to Chinese investors, which have ramped
up their activities in the country’s mining, oil, and gas industries but also pro-
vided investment capital for major infrastructure projects. While Northern in-
vestment in the country’s commodity and energy sectors remains signiﬁcant,
Peru has sought to operationalize closer commercial ties with China, which
now views the country as a leading location for investment (Sanborn and
Chonn 2015). This burgeoning relationship has been detrimental to Brazil, sup-
pressing the impetus to reignite energy exportation projects.
Conclusions
Combined, rejection of the bilateral energy accord, cancelation of the Pakitzapango
concession, and Odebrecht’s divestment from Tambo 40 represent principled
26. Second author’s interview with former deputy minister of the environment, Lima, Peru, May
2014.
27. Second author’s interviews with local environmental activists, Cajamarca, Peru, September
2014.
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socioenvironmental victories over pressures to achieve energy security through
regional integration. While CAH’s anti-Brazilian dam campaign was aided by
some favorable exogenous factors, this SSTAN nevertheless had a direct effect
on the decisions of the Peruvian state and Brazilian transnational enterprises
to abandon hydroelectric investment. Although this issue-speciﬁc campaign
was unable to leverage BNDES, it contributed to the formation of a regional
coalition that has since targeted Brazil’s national development bank. This
suggests that highly articulated SSTANs may successfully push against the
inertia of strategic national interests to achieve limited, albeit signiﬁcant,
objectives.
Importantly, our case draws attention to the agency of Southern actors that
has accompanied shifts in the loci of transnational environmental advocacy
generated by the emergence of the BRICS. This instance of exclusive South–
South energy integration precluded both government and corporate targets
from outside inﬂuence, preventing CAH from structuring its anti-Brazilian
dam campaign around a boomerang pattern. Accordingly, this network could
not activate international NGOs to advocate on behalf of grassroots groups, uti-
lizing, among other things, the leverage of multilateral fora. Instead, network
agency shifted to its Southern nodes, which responded strategically by structur-
ing its campaign around a three-pronged attack “from below.” The combination
of direct action protests, discursive engagements with policy makers and law-
makers, and a counterintuitive framing of Brazil proved successful with two
of the three targets. By hedging its bets through this triple-target strategy,
CAH provided a schema for subsequent anti-infrastructure project campaigns
in the region to possibly replicate, demonstrating how this SSTAN may be con-
tributing to governance diffusion (Kauffman 2017).
The challenges and opportunities of transnational environmental advo-
cacy within the primary sectors of the Global South warrant sustained atten-
tion within global environmental politics. Across Latin America and Africa,
many low- and middle-income countries are renewing investments in their
primary sectors as a means of achieving diverse national goals, from economic
growth and poverty reduction to energy security. Increasingly, this strategy of
resource-driven development has entailed the BRICS as ﬁnanciers and agents
of large-scale infrastructure projects. Their activities, moreover, are legitimized
by claims that South–South “cooperation” offers opportunities for less ex-
ploitive relations. While Brazil’s status as a development power has declined
markedly in the years following our case, much uncertainty remains about what
Chinese expansion entails for socioenvironmental mobilizations and cross-
border advocacy in the primary sectors of Southern countries. China’s contri-
bution to the expansion of the energy, extractive and infrastructure frontiers in
Latin America and Africa is likely to generate socioenvironmental grievances
and may even trigger new social conﬂicts, some of which may result in success-
ful advocacy campaigns. Further research on the transnational environmental
advocacy encircling South–South development initiatives can help us better
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understand not only how civil society actors are mobilizing transnationally in
response but the conditions under which they succeed or fail.
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